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Abstract In social interactions, it is common for individ-
uals to possess different amounts of knowledge about a
specific transaction, and those who are more knowledge-
able might perform opportunistic behavior to others in their
interest, which promotes their value but demotes others’
value. Such a typical social behavior is called opportunistic
behavior (opportunism). In this paper, we propose a formal
account of opportunism based on the situation calculus. We
first propose a model of opportunism that only considers a
single action between two agents, and then extend it to
multiple actions and incorporate social context in the
model. A simple example of selling a broken cup is used to
illustrate our models. Through our models, we can have a
thorough understanding of opportunism.
Keywords Opportunism  Value  Situation calculus 
Formalization
1 Introduction
Consider a common social scenario. A seller is trying to
sell a cup to a buyer, and it is known by the seller
beforehand that the cup is actually broken (e.g., there is a
crack at the bottom of the cup). The buyer buys the cup for
its good appearance, but of course gets disappointed when
he fills it with water. In this example, the seller earns
money from the buyer by exploiting the opportunity of
having more knowledge about the transaction, while the
buyer just focuses on the appearance of the cup rather than
being leaky or not. Such a social behavior intentionally
performed by the seller is first named opportunistic
behavior (or opportunism) by economist Williamson
(1975). Opportunistic behavior commonly exists in busi-
ness transactions and other types of social interactions in
various forms such as deceit, lying, and betraying. This is
because individuals working in different positions are
capable of having access to different amounts of informa-
tion, which provides the opportunity for them to gain
personal advantage, regardless of the consequences to
others. Since it has negative results for other individuals
involved in the relationship and strongly affects the coop-
erative relationship once it is unveiled, it is prevented or
eliminated by social laws and norms.
Over the years, a large amount of research from social
science was done to investigate opportunistic behavior
from its own perspective (Conner and Prahalad 1996;
Cabon-Dhersin and Ramani 2007; Jiraporn et al. 2008),
providing a descriptive theoretical foundation to the study
of opportunism. However, it is difficult for them to offer a
general model that can be applied in any context. This is
mainly because the original definition from Williamson
‘‘self-interest seeking with guile’’ is relatively implicit. On
the one hand, it strongly captures various behaviors and
activities that are judged as opportunism. On the other
hand, it makes people have different interpretations of the
concept. Therefore, there exists no agreed general and
scientific definition of opportunism, which makes the study
on its emergence and constraint mechanism even more
difficult.
Is the investigation of opportunism of interest to AI?
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societies. Viewing individuals as agents, we might have
similar phenomena in the context of multi-agent systems.
Interacting agents were designed to behave in a human-
like way with characteristics of self-interest. When such
agents possess different amounts of relevant information
about a specific transaction and try to maximize their own
benefits, those who are more knowledgable may probably
perform opportunistic behavior to other agents in their
own interest, which is against others’ benefits. For
example, lying or deception is one of the strategies in
multi-agent negotiation (Ettinger and Jehiel 2010; Zlotkin
and Rosenschein 1991), and its effects are investigated in
practical Turing tests (Warwick and Shah 2016), and it is
possible for agents to hide important information to his or
her peers for increasing his own payoff. In order to per-
form the investigation about opportunism, we first need to
have a formal specification of opportunism with widely
applicable generalization. Through the specification, we
can understand more clearly the elements in the defini-
tion, how they relate to each other, and derive interesting
properties that are useful for our future research. We
believe that such a research perspective can ease the
debates about opportunism in social science. Moreover,
future work on its emergence and constraint mechanism
can be conducted based on our formal definition, ren-
dering our study relevant for multi-agent system (MAS)
research.
In this paper, we take the initiative to propose a formal
account of opportunism. Aiming at the investigation about
the different judgment on opportunistic behavior, we
integrate the notion of value to represent agents’ preference
on situations. We then formalize opportunism using the
situation calculus (McCarthy 1968; Reiter 2001) as our
technical framework based on our extended definition. We
first propose a model of opportunism that only considers a
single action between two agents, indicating three basic
concepts such as knowledge asymmetry, value opposition,
and intention in the model, and then extend it to multiple
actions and incorporate social context in the model. A
simple example of selling a broken cup is used to illustrate
our models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
has a informal definition of opportunism extended from
Williamson’s, highlighting the key elements we need to
model. Our technical framework of the situation calculus is
briefly introduced in Sect. 3 together with the appendices
for the semantics we use. Section 4 proposes a preliminary
model of opportunism, which serves as a basis for the
following extensions. Sections 5 and 6 extend the model to
multiple actions and incorporate social context, respec-
tively. Section 7 illustrates our models by a simple exam-
ple. Section 8 addresses related work, and Sect. 9
concludes the paper.
2 Defining opportunism with value
In this section, we extend Williamson’s definition of
opportunism and suggest a more explicit one as a prelude
and basis to proposing a formal model in the next section.
2.1 Definition of opportunism
The classical definition of opportunism is offered by Wil-
liamson as ‘‘self-interest seeking with guile’’ (Williamson
1975). While this definition has been used in a large
amount of research, it only mentions two attributes, self-
interest and guile, explicitly, leaving other attributes for
researchers to interpret from different perspectives. For
example, Das defined partner opportunism as ‘‘a behavior
by a partner firm that is motivated to pursue its self-interest
with deceit to achieve gains at the expense of the other
alliance members’’ (Das and Rahman 2010). In game-
theoretical setting, Seabright defines opportunism as ‘‘the
behaviour of those who seek to benefit from the efforts of
others without contributing anything themselves’’ (Seab-
right 2010). Even though those definitions are elaborated
enough, they come from different theoretical settings. In
this study, based on the definition of Williamson, we
compare opportunistic scenarios with non-opportunistic
ones and redefine this social behavior in a more explicit
way.
Opportunism is a behavior that is motivated by self-
interest and takes advantage of relevant knowledge asym-
metry1 to achieve own gains, regardless of the principles.
First of all, there has been reached consensus that
opportunistic behavior is performed with self-interest
motivation (Das and Rahman 2010). We admit that self-
interested pursuit is the natural property of human beings,
but opportunism is more than that: Individuals with
opportunistic behavior do not care about the negative
effects on others. Secondly, relevant knowledge asymmetry
provides the chance to individuals to be opportunistic.
Opportunistic individuals may break the contracts or the
relational norms using the relevant knowledge that others
do not have. It is important for opportunistic individuals to
use cheating, deceit, or infidelity for hiding their self-in-
terest motive. Therefore, individuals with more relevant
knowledge will have more potential for being opportunis-
tic. Thirdly, principles are ignored by opportunistic indi-
viduals. The reason to use ‘‘ignore’’ here is to distinguish
1 Many papers in social science use information asymmetry to
represent the situation where one party in a transaction knows more
compared to another. We argue that once the information is stored in
our mind and can be used appropriately, it becomes our knowledge.
For this reason, we would rather revise the term as knowledge




opportunism from accidentally bringing harm to others.
Opportunistic behavior is performed intentionally without
any compensation to the victims. Principles can be the
value of others, or the contract rules or the relational norms
that are used for balancing various interests and already
agreed to by a majority of the individuals. Fourthly, even
though we do not explicitly declare the result of performing
opportunistic behavior in our extended definition, such a
social behavior must result in gains at the expense of
others. Any self-interested behavior that does not end up in
affecting other individuals should not be considered as
opportunism.
From the above elaboration, we can derive something
interesting and important about opportunism: Opportunistic
individuals ignore the interest of others, which means that
it is already known by them that the behavior will cause
harm to others; as opportunistic individuals intend to gain
personal advantage, can we say that it is also their intention
to cause harm to others? We will investigate this problem
through our formal models of opportunism.
2.2 Integrating with value
Based on the informal definition of opportunism, the
example about hiding important information from peers
that we encountered in the introduction is opportunistic
behavior, since it is against others’ benefits or the norms of
the system. However, if hiding is not forbidden by the
norm, the agent could not be said to have done anything
wrong. Or if hiding is accepted by peers, it may not be
against their interest. We can see that both the system’s
norms and the agents’ perspectives can influence the
judgment of opportunism, and they are the representation
of value systems at the collective level and individual level,
respectively, which might be different among systems and
agents.
Value is something that we think is important, and
various types of values together with their orderings form a
value system. By integrating the notion of value into our
model, the result of performing opportunistic behavior is
represented as the promotion of opportunistic individuals’
value and the demotion of others’ value. Furthermore, even
though a value system is relatively stable within individ-
uals, it may differ across different individuals and societies.
For different societies, each has its own value system as
part of the social context, and it serves as the basis for any
judgment within the society. In this sense, some behaviors
which are regarded as opportunistic in one society may not
be considered as opportunistic in another society, if the two
societies do not share the same value system. A similar
idea, although more focusing on opportunistic propensity,
can be found in Chen et al. (2002). Given the value system
of the society, opportunistic behavior promotes the self-
interest which is in opposition with others’ value.
3 Technical framework: situation calculus
The situation calculus provides a formal language for
representing and reasoning about dynamical worlds based
on first-order logic. Its idea is that we can represent any
reachable states in terms of actions that are required to
reach them, and that the reachable states are called situa-
tions. There are three elements: actions Act that can be
performed by agents, situations S that represent a history of
action occurrences, and fluents F that describe the prop-
erties of the situation. Situation S0 represents the initial
situation that no action can result in. The properties of
situations are specified through relational and functional
fluents taking a situation term as their last argument, which
means their truth value may vary from situation to situa-
tion. The relational fluents can be true or false, while the
functional fluents can take a range of values. For instance,
ontableðx; sÞ is a relational fluent which is true in situation
s where object x is on the table, and temperatureðsÞ is a
functional fluent whose value in situation s is an integer
representing the temperature of the environment.
To represent how situations change, one has to specify
in which situation an action can be performed and how to
reason about the changes in the world by performing an
action. In the situation calculus, we use predicate symbol
Possða; sÞ to denote the set of preconditions that action a is
executable in situation s, and a distinguished binary func-
tion doða; sÞ to denote the unique successor situation that
results from the performance of action a in situation s. For
example, in order to pick up object x, one must have an
empty hand and object x must be on the table in situation s:
PossðpickðxÞ; sÞ  handemptyðsÞ ^ ontableðx; sÞ:
And doðpickðxÞ; sÞ represents the situation that results from
the performance of action pickupðxÞ in situation s. One
more example: In order to repair object x in situation s, the
object x must be broken, and there must be a glue available
in situation s:
PossðrepairðxÞ; sÞ  brokenðx; sÞ ^ hasglueðsÞ:
Other special predicates and functions can be introduced as
needed. For instance, propositions P can be used as
assertions from classical proposition logic instead of flu-
ents, that is, their truth values are not dependent on the
situation but consistent throughout all the situations.
With the situation calculus, we can reason about how the
world changes as the result of the available actions. The
effects of actions are specified through successor state
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axioms. For example, the effect on fluent broken of object x
is:
brokenðx; doða; sÞÞ  brokenðx; sÞ _ ð9rÞfragileðx; sÞ ^ a
¼ dropðr; xÞ;
which is saying that object x will be broken in the successor
situation doða; sÞ if and only if x is fragile in s and the
action that takes us to the successor situation is someone
r dropping x, or x is already broken in s.
This is a brief overview of the situation calculus,
which is the technical preliminary of our formalization.
However, this language can only provide information
about the history of a situation, and there is no way to
represent the future of a situation. For example, propo-
sitions like ‘‘I shall sell the cup now’’ cannot be repre-
sented by situation calculus. Since this representation is of
great importance to our formalization, we extend the
situation to one step further in the future. An extended
situation is a pair ðs; s0Þ such that s is a situation and s0 is
the next situation of s connected with an action, and
occur is a relation between actions and situations. Here is
the semantics of occur:
ðs; s0Þ occurða; sÞ iff s0 ¼ doða; sÞ. That is, occurða; sÞ
holds if action a occurs in situation s.
From now on, the situation calculus we are using as our
technical framework will be extended with the semantics
above.
After John McCarthy’s introduction of this theory,
people made extensions capable of representing knowl-
edge, belief, intention, and obligation in order to better
reason about actions and their effects on the world (Shapiro
et al. 2011; Scherl and Levesque 2003; Demolombe and
Parra 2009). We will introduce and adopt those extensions
in the following sections as appropriate. Since in the situ-
ation calculus the last argument is always a situation, we
will follow this convention in this paper for any definition
of fluents and predicates.
4 Formalizing opportunism
For better understanding, we first propose a preliminary
model of opportunism that only considers a single action
between two agents, without any legal or moral evalua-
tion. It serves as a basis for the extensions of multiple
actions and social context in the following sections. We
will use normal possible-world semantics to define
knowledge and neighborhood semantics to define inten-
tion. Ones who are unfamiliar with the two types of
semantics can refer to ‘‘Appendices 2 and 3’’ for their
introductions.
4.1 Knowledge asymmetry
We adopt the approach of Scherl to formalizing knowl-
edge, which is to add an agents’ possible-world model of
knowledge to situation calculus (Scherl and Levesque
2003). To treat knowledge as a fluent, we have a binary
relation Kðs0; sÞ, reading as situation s0 is epistemically
accessible from situation s. It is reflexive (K(s, s) holds for
all s 2 S), transitive (Kðs; s0Þ ^ Kðs0; s00Þ implies Kðs; s00Þ for
all s; s0; s00 2 S) and symmetric (Kðs; s0Þ implies Kðs0; sÞ for
all s; s0 2 S).
Definition 1 (Knowledge)
Knowði;/; sÞ¼defð8s0ÞKiðs0; sÞ ! /½s0
This definition shows that agent i has knowledge about
/ if and only if / holds in all the epistemic possible
situations of the agent. Then, we can have the definition of
knowledge asymmetry.
Definition 2 (Knowledge Asymmetry)
KnowAsymði; j;/;sÞ¼def
Knowði;/;sÞ^:Knowðj;/;sÞ^Knowði;:Knowðj;/;sÞ;sÞ
KnowAsym is a fluent in situation s where agent i has
knowledge about / while agent j does not have it, and this
is also known by agent i. It can be the other way around
with i and j. But for simplicity of our model, we limit this
definition to one case. Note that / can represent any
proposition in this definition.
4.2 Value opposition
From the definition of opportunism, we know that agents
have different evaluations on the same state transition. For
agent i who performs opportunistic behavior, his value gets
promoted, while the value of agent j gets demoted. We
argue that this is because agents always have the evaluation
from their perspective, which is part of their value system.
This property of state transition is named value opposition
in this study. In order to extend our technical framework
with value theory, we define a symbol V to represent
agents’ value system and a binary relation\over situations
to represent agents’ preference, where s\V s0 denotes ‘‘s0
is preferred to s based on value system V’’.
In the situation calculus, situations can be described in
terms of propositions P, which are structured with objects
and their properties. For having preferences on situations,
we argue that agents evaluate the truth value of specific
propositions, which are called perspectives in this study,
based on their value systems. For instance, the buyer tries
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to see whether the cup has good quality or not in order to
have a preference on the situations before and after the
transaction. In order to specify agents’ preference on sit-
uations, we first define a function EvalRef that represents
agents’ perspective for evaluation:
Definition 3 (Evaluation Reference)
EvalRef : V  S S ! P
It returns a proposition that an agent refers to for
specifying his preference on two situations based on his
value system. It is worth noting that in real life, agents’
specification of preferences on situations is based on a set
of propositions 2P rather than a single proposition. For
instance, both whether the cup has good quality and
appearance are important to the buyer. For simplicity, here
we restrict the return value to only one proposition without
loss of generality.
We then specify agents’ preferences on situations, where
V is restricted to perspective-based value:
s\Vi s
0  :pðsÞ ^ pðs0Þ where p ¼ EvalRef ðVi; s; s0Þ
s[ Vi s
0  pðsÞ ^ :pðs0Þ where p ¼ EvalRef ðVi; s; s0Þ
It means that agent i’s value gets promoted/demoted from s
to s0 when the truth value of the proposition p that he refers
to based on his value system Vi changes. As for the
example about selling the broken cup, the seller’s value
gets promoted when he has earned money from the trans-
action, whereas the buyer’s value gets demoted when the
cup he bought is broken. Because of having different value
systems, they refer to different propositions and thereby
evaluate different propositions for specifying their prefer-
ences. Similar to knowledge asymmetry, we only limit the
specification to one case in terms of the truth value of p.
Definition 4 (Value Opposition)
ValueOppoði; j; s; s0Þ¼def s\Vi s0 ^ s[ Vj s0
We define value opposition as a property of a state
transition where a state transition from s to s0 can promote
the value of agent i but demote the value of agent j. In other
words, agent i has positive effects from the state transition,
while agent j has negative effects. Again, we only limit the
definition to one case for simplicity.
4.3 Intention
Opportunistic behavior is performed by intent rather than
by accident. In order to suggest this aspect in our formal
model, we adopt the logic of intention to do something for
being something in our framework. The notion of Intend is
defined through neighborhood semantics instead of Kripke
semantics. This is because agents need not intend all the
expected side effects of their intentions as Bratman argued
(Bratman 1987). For example, an agent has a toothache and
is going to see the dentist with intention to get his tooth
fixed. Although the agent believes that it will cause him
much pain, we surely cannot say that he intends to get the
pain. The formal definition of Intend is given as follows:
Definition 5 (Intention)
Intendði; a;/; sÞ¼def jjAjj 2 NIði; sÞ;
where
jjAjj ¼ fs0 2 S j occurða; s0Þ ^ /½s0; doða; s0Þg
NIðsÞ is an intentional neighborhood function of an
agent that returns a set of subsets of S, meaning that what is
the case in the neighborhood is intended to have
in situation s. occurða; s0Þ is true when action a is
performed in situation s0, and / is true in the state
transition. An intention of agent i Intendði; a;/; sÞ holds if
and only if the truth set of occurða; s0Þ and /½s0; doða; s0Þ is
an intentional neighborhood in s. Based on this definition
of intention, we have two instances for value promotion
proðjÞ ¼ s0\Vj doða; s0Þ and value demotion deðjÞ ¼
s0[ Vjdoða; s0Þ by action a, which will be later used for
providing the final definition and proving its properties
Intendði; a; proðj; vÞ; sÞ¼def jjAjj 2 NIði; sÞ;
where
jjAjj ¼ fs0 2 S j occurða; s0Þ ^ s0\Vjdoða; s0Þg
Intendði; a; deðj; vÞ; sÞ¼def jjAjj 2 NIði; sÞ;
where
jjAjj ¼ fs0 2 S j occurða; s0Þ ^ s0[ Vj doða; s0Þg
Intendði; a; proðjÞ; sÞ denotes that agent i intends to pro-
mote the value of agent j by action a in situation s. Similar
for Intendði; a; deðjÞ; sÞ. When i ¼ j, agent i intends to
promote/demote his own value by action a.
4.4 Opportunistic behavior
The above definitions are basic ingredients that we need for
having the formal model of opportunism: knowledge
asymmetry as the precondition, value opposition as the
effect, and intention as the mental state. Besides, based on
the informal definition we gave in Sect. 2, there are two
more aspects that should be suggested in the definition.
Firstly, the knowledge that the performer has while others
do not have should be relevant to the state transition.
Secondly, the performer is aware of value opposition for
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the state transition beforehand but still ignores it. Oppor-
tunism is defined as follows:
Definition 6 (Opportunism) Let D be a situation calculus
BAT2, K and I be the axioms for knowledge and intention
representation in the situation calculus, respectively, V be
the value system of agents, EvalRef be the reference
function representing the object for an agent’s evaluation
on situations, and \V be a preference ordering on situa-
tions. Then, ðD [ K [ I;V ;EvalRef ;\VÞ is a situation
calculus BAT extended with knowledge, intention, value,
and preference. Within this system, we have
Opportunismði; j; a; sÞ¼defPossði; j; a; sÞ^
Intendði; a; proðiÞ; sÞ ^ /
where Possði; j; a; sÞ  KnowAsymði; j;/; sÞ
/ ¼ ValueOppoði; j; s; doða; sÞÞ:
This formula defines a predicate Opportunism where
action a is opportunistic behavior performed by agent i to
agent j in the situation s. In this concise formula, the
precondition of action a is knowledge asymmetry about the
state transition from s to do(a, s), and action a is performed
by intent and results in value opposition.
One observation from the model is about the subjectivity
of opportunism. We can see through the functional fluent
EvalRef that agents always evaluate the situations and
consequently the state transition from their own perspec-
tives, which are part of their value systems. If the value
systems upon which they have evaluation change to other
ones, the property of value opposition may become false.
Opportunism is presented as a problem in most research
about it. However, the above formal model of opportunism
implies that it depends on from which perspective, or more
generally value system, we evaluate the state transition. It
is positive from the perspective of agent i, while it is
negative from the perspective of agent j. In reality and
multi-agent systems, people usually take the established
norms into consideration when they decide whether it
should be prevented, and the result may be different from
society to society and from system to system.
After having the formal model of opportunism, we show
how the propositions we informally suggest in text at the
beginning is captured by our formalization.
Proposition 1 Given an opportunistic behavior a per-
formed by agent i to agent j, each agent evaluates the
behavior from a different perspective, which is formalized
as:
Opportunismði; j; a; sÞ ! EvalRef ðVi; s; doða; sÞÞ
6¼ EvalRef ðVj; s; doða; sÞÞ
Proof If Opportunismði; j; a; sÞ holds, the property
ValueOppoði; j; s; doða; sÞÞ also holds. Following the
definition of value opposition, we have
s\Vidoða; sÞ ^ s[ Vjdoða; sÞ:
The specification of s\Vidoða; sÞ is
:pðsÞ ^ pðdoða; sÞÞ where p ¼ EvalRef ðVi; s; doða; sÞÞ
ð1Þ
The specification of s[ Vjdoða; sÞ is
qðsÞ ^ :qðdoða; sÞÞ where q ¼ EvalRef ðVj; s; doða; sÞÞ
ð2Þ
Sentences (1) and (2) hold together. Since any formula has
only one truth value given a situation, we have p 6¼ q, that
is,
EvalRef ðVi; s; doða; sÞÞ 6¼ EvalRef ðVj; s; doða; sÞÞ: h
Proposition 2 Given an opportunistic behavior a
performed by agent i to agent j, agent i knows the
performance of this behavior demotes agent j’s value, but
needs not intend to get this result for agent j, which is
characterized by:
Opportunismði; j; a; sÞ ! Knowði; s[ Vj doða; sÞ; sÞ
2Opportunismði; j; a; sÞ ! Intendði; a; deðj; vÞ; sÞ
Proof The first formula is already in the definition of
opportunism, so we are going to prove the second one.
In our model, opportunistic behavior is performed with
intention and opportunistic behavior implies agent j’s
value gets demoted, then definitely agent j’s value gets
demoted in agent i’s intentional neighborhood where
opportunistic behavior holds (denoted as set O). In
neighborhood semantics, if it holds that agent i intends
to demote agent j’s value, then the truth set that agent
j’s value gets demoted (denoted as set D) must be an
intentional neighborhood of agent i. However, we only
know that O is an intentional neighborhood of agent i
and D might be bigger than O (O  D) so that
D might not necessarily be an intentional
neighborhood. Therefore, we can theoretically
conclude that agent i might not intend to demote
agent j’s value.
We can also empirically prove it. Free riding is one of
the classic models about opportunism, and it occurs when
someone benefits from resources, goods, or services but




under-provision of those goods or services, or in an overuse
or degradation of a common property resource (Baumol
1967). Suppose agent i is a free rider, it is rather weird to
say that agent i intends to reduce others’ share of public
goods. h
The proposition shows that it is not the intention of
opportunistic individuals to harm others even though
opportunism is deliberate with self-interest motive. The
ignored principles are a specific kind of knowledge about
the interest of others that cannot be considered as an
intention to be opportunistic. h
5 Opportunistic behavior for multiple actions
In the previous section, we only consider one single
action as opportunistic behavior. But in the real life, it is
common that opportunistic behavior consists of multiple
actions. For instance, unlike the simple selling example at
the beginning of this paper, commerce transactions
between businesses usually have a couple of actions, each
of which ends up in a situation. In this context, the whole
sequence of actions is opportunistic behavior instead of
any single action within. Of course, a sequence of actions
can be seen as one action if we only look at the pre-
condition of the first action and the effect of the last
action, but we may also be interested in what properties
we can derive from opportunistic behavior when consid-
ering multiple actions.
In situation calculus, a binary function do(a, s) is used
to denote the situation resulting from performing action a
in situation s, so for a finite sequence of actions
½a1; . . .; an, the situation resulting from performing the
sequence of actions in situation s is denoted as
doðan; doðan1; . . .; doða1; sÞÞÞ. Each action within the
sequence brings about a new situation that satisfies certain
properties. Formally, based on Definition 6, opportunism
for multiple actions is defined as below:
Definition 7 (Opportunism for Multiple Actions) Let D be
a situation calculus BAT, K and I be the axioms for
knowledge and intention representation in the situation
calculus, respectively, V be the value system of agents,
EvalRef be the reference function representing the object
for an agent’s evaluation on situations, and \V be a
preference ordering on situations. Then, ðD [ K [
I;V;EvalRef ;\VÞ is a situation calculus BAT extended
with knowledge, intention, value, and preference. Within
this system, we have
Opportunismði; j; ½a1; . . .; an; s1Þ¼def^
1 k n
Possði; j; ak; skÞ ^ Intendði; ak; proðiÞ; skÞ ^ /
where Possði; j; ak; skÞ  KnowAsymði; j;/; skÞ
/ ¼ ValueOppoði; j; s1; do
ðan; doðan1; . . .; doða1; s1ÞÞÞÞ
sk ¼ doðak1; . . .; doða1; s1ÞÞð1\k nÞ:
Because each action in the sequence must be possible to
be performed and it is the property of intention to be
persistent (Bratman 1987), knowledge asymmetry and
intention is true in sk for 1 k n. Value opposition is
the property of the state transition by the sequence of
actions. A finite sequence of actions ½a1; . . .; an], which is
performed by agent i to agent j in situation s1, is
opportunistic behavior if and only if each action is
possible to be performed with the intention to promote
agent i’s value and the whole sequence results in value
opposition for agent i and j.
Regarding the effects of opportunistic behavior, agent
j’s value gets demoted by the behavior, which can be
permanent or repairable. In the former case, it is impossible
to compensate the negative effect on agent j (e.g., some-
body dies from it), while in the latter case, it is possible in
some forms (e.g., a broken cup can be returned). Since
opportunistic behavior is performed by intent, we argue
that agent i will not actively compensate agent j’s loss, no
matter it is permanent or repairable. For this reason, we
introduce the following definition non-compensation for
agent j, which is an essential property of opportunism:
Definition 8 (Non-compensation) Given a sequence of
actions Seq ¼ ½a1; . . .; an as opportunistic behavior
Opportunismði; j; Seq; s1Þ and q ¼ EvalRef ðVj; s; doða; sÞÞ,
we say that Seq is non-compensated for agent j iff 9k :
ak 2 Seq such that for the subsequence of actions
SeqB ¼ ½a1; . . .; ak
qðs1Þ ^ :qðdoðSeqB; s1ÞÞ
and for the subsequence of actions SeqR ¼ ½akþ1; . . .; an,
8m : am 2 SeqR
qðdoðam; smÞÞ  qðsmÞ:
By this definition, we separate the sequence of actions
into two parts: SeqB that brings about :q, and SeqR that
retains :q. Note that SeqR can be empty, which implies that
the whole sequence brings about :q and the situation
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transition is permanent and irreversible. Moreover, as the
whole sequence of actions is performed by agent i, the
compensation for agent j’s loss comes from agent i rather
than agent j itself or someone else.
Definition 7 together with its property of non-compen-
sation captures some interesting properties, which cannot
be derived from Definition 6. First of all,
Proposition 3 For a sequence of actions Seq ¼ ½a1; . . .; an
being opportunistic behavior opportunism(i, j, Seq, s), we
have
Opportunismði; j; Seq; sÞ ! ð9a 62 SeqRÞ:s[
Vjdoð½SeqB; a; sÞ
It implies that the negative effect of opportunistic
behavior on agent j could have been compensated but is not
done by agent i. Typically, when SeqR is empty, it is
meaningless to talk about action a, because the negative
effect is permanent.
Proposition 4 Given a finite sequence of actions
½a1; . . .; an as opportunistic behavior, we can prove that
Opportunismði; j; ½a1; . . .; an; s1Þ !
KnowAsymði; j;/; skÞ  KnowAsymði; j;/; doðak; skÞÞ
ð1\k\nÞ
Proof Each action in the sequence is possible to be
performed and also
Possði; j; ak; skÞ  KnowAsymði; j;/; skÞð1 k nÞ
sk ¼ doðak1; . . .; doða1; s1ÞÞð1\k nÞ
Combining these two formulas, we can easily get
KnowAsymði; j;/; skÞ  KnowAsymði; j;/; doðak; skÞÞ
ð1 k\nÞ: h
This proposition shows that, when opportunistic behavior
consists of a sequence of actions, property knowledge
asymmetry is preserved throughout the whole sequence.
Proposition 5 Given a finite sequence of actions
½a1; . . .; an as opportunistic behavior, we can prove action
ai needs not be opportunistic, which is characterized by
2Opportunismði; j; ½a1; . . .; an; s1Þðn[ 1Þ !
Opportunismði; j; ak; skÞð1 k nÞ
Proof In order to prove this proposition, we are going to
find a counterexample of opportunistic behavior which
satisfies condition n[ 1; but each action does not satisfy
all the properties of opportunism.
Freeriding is still a nice model to prove this property.
Since freeriding is one form of opportunistic behavior,
Opportunismði; others; freeride; s1Þ is true in our model.
Now, we are going to split it into a sequence of actions
½a1; . . .; an and suppose a free rider exist in a society with a
large population and benefits from the public goods
without paying. Since the amount that the free rider is
supposed to pay is shared by a large population, other
agents do not notice (or even not care about) the small
change in the current situation thus not getting their value
demoted for little amount of freeriding. That is, for action
ak,
EvalRef ðVothers; sk; doðak; skÞÞ ¼ >
so that s\Vothersdoða; sÞ does not hold any more. Therefore,
it is not true that
Opportunismði; j; ak; skÞð1 k nÞ:
h
However, once the amount that the free rider is sup-
posed to pay accumulates to be large enough for getting
other agents’ value demoted (the whole sequence of actions
is considered), will it be regarded as opportunistic behav-
ior. By theoretical comparison, this example is quite sim-
ilar to Sorites paradox, where grains are individually
removed from a heap of sands and the heap stops being a
heap when the process is repeated for enough times Hyde
(2014). So it is also interesting to think about when the
behavior starts to be regarded as opportunistic.
In the example above, the negative effect associated
with agents’ preference is ignored for its small change. It is
also possible that the information associated with an
agent’s preference is blocked such that he cannot specify
his preference on the situations and consequently cannot
evaluate the actions. Only when he receives the specific
information and compares his current situation with pre-
vious situations can the sequence of actions be considered
as opportunistic behavior.
6 Opportunistic behavior with social context
In the previous sections, we made an assumption for the
sake of simplicity that there is no legal or moral evaluation
being made or implied to opportunistic behavior such that
it is not necessarily good or bad. However, agents in MAS
are residing in a social context which provides obligations,
permissions, and other types of norms for guiding agents’
behaviors. The setting of those norms reflects the value
system of a MAS. To have a formal model of opportunism
with social context, we can of course replace the agent j in
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our previous models with a society (in this way, we see the
whole society as an agent) and get similar properties as in
last two sections, but now we are more interested in putting
opportunism in a deontic-based social context to see how it
relates to social norms. Thus, in this section, we are going
to place opportunistic behavior into a social context with
norms and propose a formal model of opportunism from
this perspective.
For defining opportunistic behavior with a social con-
text, we adopt the definition of knowledge asymmetry and
intention in previous sections but redefine value opposition.
Firstly, we have three normative statuses, which are similar
to deontic logic.
• it is obligatory that (OB)
• it is permissible that (PE)
• it is forbidden that (FO)
Secondly, we define the above deontic notions for spec-
ifying the normative propositions P.
Definition 9 (Obligatory, Permissible, and Forbidden)
OBði; a; sÞ¼defð8s0ÞRiðs0; sÞ ! occurða; s0Þ
PEði; a; sÞ¼defð9s0ÞRiðs0; sÞ ^ occurða; s0Þ
FOði; a; sÞ¼defð8s0ÞRiðs0; sÞ ! :occurða; s0Þ
where Riðs0; sÞ denotes the deontic accessibility relation of
agent i, meaning that what is the case in situation s0 is
ideal for situation s, and occurða; s0Þ is true when action a
is performed in situation s0. R-relation is serial, which
means for all situations s, there is at least one possible
situation s0 such that Riðs0; sÞ holds. This property of R-
relation ensures the validity OBði; a; sÞ ! PEði; a; sÞ to
be hold, which is also consistent with our intuition. Each
modality can be taken as a basic to define the other two
modalities.
We then specify the social preference on situations,
where V is restricted to deontic-based social value.
s\VAs
0  ð9a; iÞs0 ¼ doða; sÞ ^ OBði; a; sÞ
s[ VAs
0  ð9a; iÞs0 ¼ doða; sÞ ^ FOði; a; sÞ
Here, symbol A represents the whole society, which is a set
of agents. The first one means that the social value gets
promoted if there exists an action whose performance
complies with the social norm, while the second one means
that the social value gets demoted if there exists an action
whose performing violates the social norm.
Together with the specification of agents’ preferences on
situations, we have the definition of value opposition
between an agent and the whole society.
Definition 10 (Value Opposition with Social Context)
ValueOppoði;A; s; s0Þ¼def s\Vis0 ^ s[ VAs0
For the state transition from s to s0, the value of agent
i gets promoted, whereas the social value gets demoted.
Again, we only limit the definition to one case excluding
the other way around for simplicity.
Therefore, similar to Definition 6, we have the definition
of opportunistic behavior with social context.
Definition 11 (Opportunism with Social Context) Let D
be a situation calculus BAT, K and I be the axioms for
knowledge and intention representation in the situation
calculus, respectively, V be the value system of agents,
EvalRef be the reference function representing the object
for an agent’s evaluation on situations, P be a finite set of
normative propositions, and \V be a preference ordering
on situations. Then, ðD [ K [ I;V ;EvalRef ;P;\VÞ is a
situation calculus BAT extended with knowledge, intention,
value, norms, and preference. Within this system, we have
Opportunismði;A; a; sÞ¼defPossði;A; a; sÞIntendði; a; proðiÞ; sÞ ^/
where Possði;A; a; sÞ  KnowAsymði;A;/; sÞ
/ ¼ ValueOppoði;A; s; doða; sÞÞ:
Action a performed by agent i is regarded as
opportunistic behavior if and only if it is performed with
the asymmetric knowledge / about the state transition
from s to do(a, s) and the intention of self-interest, and
results in value opposition against the society A where he is
staying.
The definition of opportunistic behavior with a social
context shows that given the value system of a society,
opportunistic behavior is considered to be bad since its
performance results in demoting the social value. Further,
it implies the moral dilemma concerning the conflict
between desire and obligation. More precisely, an agent
has the desire ‘‘to do what he wants,’’ while the social
context where the agent is residing gives the obligation ‘‘to
do what one ought to do.’’ Opportunistic agents follow
their desire but ignore the obligation. Hence, it should be
prohibited by laws or social norms from the perspective of
the whole society.
Since we assume a social context with norms in this
section, it is worth investigating the relation between
deontic notions and mental states. Our formalization gov-
erns Proposition 6 regarding opportunistic agents having
knowledge about the relevant norms, and Proposition 7 and
Proposition 8 about the intention of opportunistic behavior
not being derived from the obligation.
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Proposition 6 Let action a be opportunistic behavior
performed by agent i within society A in situation s, for the
normative proposition associated with action a
FOði; a; sÞ 2 P we have
Opportunismði;A; a; sÞ ! Knowði;FOði; a; sÞ; sÞ
Proof Since Opportunism(i, A, a, s) holds, by Definition
11, agent i must have knowledge about the effect of
performing action a, that is, Knowði;/; sÞ holds, where /
represents value opposition. By Definition 10,
/ ¼ s\Vidoða; sÞ ^ s[ VAdoða; sÞ. Therefore,
Knowði; s[ VAdoða; sÞ; sÞ holds. Because V is restricted to
deontic-based social value in our model, s[ VAdoða; sÞ 
FOða; sÞ holds, thereby Know(i, FO(i, a, s), s) holds as
well. h
Agents have the knowledge about the relevant norms in
the society and decide whether and which to comply with
based on their own analysis. Typically, opportunistic
agents behave in their interest, regardless of the social
norms they are supposed to follow.
Moreover, as Broersen and his colleagues indicate in
their BOLD architecture (Broersen et al. 2005), intention
might be derived from obligation (e.g., I ought to go to
work this morning, so I intend to go to work this morning),
or might just come from agents’ own desire (e.g., I feel
thirsty, so I intend to get some water). In a given situation,
agents intend to perform opportunistic behavior, which is
motivated by self-interest. In order to prove this property
rigorously, we should first prove the disobedience of
opportunistic behavior.
Proposition 7 Let action a be opportunistic behavior
performed by agent i within society A in situation s, and Vi
be agent i’s value system, we can prove
Opportunismði;A; a; sÞ ! ðVi 6¼ ObedienceÞ
Proof By contradiction, we assume that Vi ¼ Obedience.
Because agent i obeys to the social norm in order to
promote his value, action a should not be forbidden by the
society, that is, FO(a, s) does not hold. Consequently,
s[ VAdoða; sÞ and Opportunism(i, A, a, s) do not hold,
either. Therefore, Vi ¼ Obedience is false for opportunistic
behavior. h
Using Proposition 7, we are going to prove it is not the
case for opportunistic behavior that the intention is derived
from the obligation.
Proposition 8 Let action a be opportunistic behavior
performed by agent i within society A in situation s, for the
social norm associated with action a OBði; a; sÞ 2 P, we
can prove
6 Opportunismði;A; a; sÞ ! ðOBði; a; sÞ ! Intendði; a; proðiÞ; sÞÞ
Proof We can prove this proposition by contradiction.
Suppose action a is opportunistic behavior and sentence
OBði; a; sÞ ! Intendði; a; proðiÞ; sÞ holds in our model,
which means the intended situations of agent i are the
subset of ideal situations, formalized as
ð8s0ÞðAÞ ! Riðs0; sÞ, where ðAÞ ¼ s0 2 S j occurða; s0Þ.
Therefore, agent i intends to promote his own value and
the social value by action a. Of course, when agent i’s
value is obedience, both agent i’s value and the social value
are promoted. But we have already proved in 7 that this
possibility does not exist. So our assumption at the
beginning is wrong. Therefore, OBði; a; sÞ !
Intendði; a; proðiÞ; sÞ does not hold in our model. h
7 Example: selling a broken cup
Recall the example that we used to introduce opportunism
at the beginning of the paper. The scenario is simple but
enough to illustrate our formal specification of oppor-
tunism. We label the seller and the buyer as s and b, who
can be in one of the situations: S0 (the initial situation,
before the transaction) and doða; S0Þ (after the transaction).
The seller can either sell the cup (a ¼ sellðxÞ) or keep it. If
the seller performs the action sell(x) in S0, then situation
will go to doðsellðxÞ; S0Þ.
In situation S0, the asymmetric knowledge owned by the
seller but not the buyer is not only about the broken cup,
but also the state transition: Once the transaction finishes,
the situation will go from S0 to doðsellðxÞ; S0Þ, which gets
the value of the seller promoted, whereas the value of the
buyer demoted. That is, the precondition KnowAsymðs; b;
/; S0Þ holds. Now consider the value for both parties.
Apparently, both parties go for economic value. However,
they have different and contradictory perspectives about
the economic value. What the seller looks at is how much
money he earns from the transaction. When the broken cup
has already been sold, his value gets promoted
(S0\VsdoðsellðxÞ; S0Þ holds). Conversely, what the buyer
looks at is whether the cup has good quality or not. So once
the buyer knows the cup is broken, his value gets demoted
(S0[ VbdoðsellðxÞ; S0Þ holds). The above two sentences
ensure sentence ValueOppoðs; b; S0; doðsellðxÞ; S0ÞÞ holds.
Further, since it is the seller’s intention to sell the broken
cup to the buyer for promoting his value, sentence
Intendðs; sellðxÞ; proðsÞ; S0Þ also holds. With the above
formalization, the formula for this example
Opportunismðs; b; sellðxÞ; S0Þ holds.
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We now discuss two interesting situations extended
from the simple example. Firstly, if the buyer buys the cup
only for decoration without using it, he will never know the
cup is broken or even cares about it. That is, the buyer’s
perspective is revised to EvalRef ðVb; S0; doðsellðxÞ; S0ÞÞ ¼
appearance and then sentence S0[ VbdoðsellðxÞ; S0Þ does
not hold any more. In this case, because the two perspec-
tives are not contradictory, the seller’s behavior is not
opportunistic from the perspective of the buyer, if the
social norms are not taken into account. It is already proved
in Proposition 1 that agents have different perspectives
about the same state transition if there is opportunistic
behavior between those two agents. But the above discus-
sion shows that having different perspectives does not
necessarily lead to opportunistic behavior: they must be
contradictory. The subjectivity of opportunism is reflected
by the different judgments on the same action.
Secondly, if there is nothing, the seller can do except
sell the broken cup when being in state S0, it will be
regarded as opportunistic behavior based on Definition 6,
with the nature of self-defense, which might be allowed by
the society. It is because there is no moral or legal evalu-
ation in this definition, thus no matter whether the behavior
is good or bad. However, it will be different if we analyze
it with Definition 11. Suppose self-defense behavior is
allowed by the society ðPEði; a; S0ÞÞ. Then,
S0[ VAdoðsellðxÞ; S0Þ does not hold, and then selling a
broken cup is not opportunistic behavior from the per-
spective of the society. In our example, however, the
options available to the buyer in state S0 are fsell; keepg,
which means it is not the only choice for the seller to sell
the broken cup. Moreover, sometimes it is our intention to
put ourselves in a situation where we only have one option
to choose. In this case, the action with the nature of self-
defense might not be opportunistic, but the whole sequence
of actions that illustrates how the situation arrives in one
option available might be opportunistic.
Further, with the help of our model, we can gain prac-
tical insights into constraint mechanism of opportunism. In
our case, one important reason why the seller’s behavior is
seen as opportunistic is that the seller and the buyer eval-
uate the state transition from two contradictory perspec-
tives based on their value systems. In other words, even
though they both go for economic value, they look at dif-
ferent things for evaluation. When applying this approach
in collaborative relationship, it is much easier to under-
stand how the relationship ends in defection. Therefore,
one deterrence mechanism for partner opportunism is to
avoid having contrasted value systems in the relationship.
As for the precondition of opportunism, even though it is
difficult to prevent knowledge asymmetry in business
transactions, we still need to think about how much
information we can provide to our partners, especially
during negotiation, and how they are going to use the
information.
8 Discussion
As we try to propose a simple but elegant model of
opportunism for different context settings, our specification
might not manage to capture every possible scenario. For
instance, in Sect. 4 we only talk about the interaction
between two agents and investigate the evaluation on the
state transition based on the value system of the two agents
who are involved in the transaction. But actually such
evaluation can also be done by others. This is because in
the specification of value promotion and demotion, the
proposition evaluated based on an agent’s value system is
not necessarily related to the transactions he is involved.
Assume that a friend of the buyer knows the story about the
broken cup. He may get angry with the seller for the unfair
transaction, and then, the behavior performed by the seller
is regarded as opportunistic from his perspective, even
though he is not involved. In other words, the judgment of
opportunism is subjective not only for the agents involved,
but also for anybody who evaluate the action based on his
or her own value system. Further, our models only consider
intentional actions. However, opportunistic behavior can
also be about intentional inactions such as withholding
information. In this case, the social value gets demoted for
agent i’s not performing an obligatory action instead of
performing a forbidden action. Of course, our models can
capture this scenario in a way that doing nothing can be
seen as a particular way of doing something. Interesting
insights can be gained from further study on this part.
We also propose that the asymmetric knowledge
obtained by opportunistic agents is value opposition about
the state transition, which is out of our intuition. The reason
can be shown by the example in Sect. 7. Intuitively, the
asymmetric knowledge that the seller has is about the
broken cup. Now, we assume that both the seller and the
buyer know the cup is broken and the seller sells it with a
high price. Once the buyer knows that the broken cup is not
worth that price, his value will get demoted. From that, we
can see it does not matter whether the fact about the broken
cup is only known by one party beforehand, but whether
value opposition about the transaction is only known by
one party beforehand. In other words, the asymmetric
knowledge is not about the objective fact, but about agents’
evaluation on the state transition.
The definition of non-compensation for multiple actions
is introduced, based on the fact that the negative effect of
opportunistic behavior can be permanent or repairable.
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Given a social context, the norm that opportunistic
behavior triggers (violates) can be repaired or not based on
the same fact. In the former case, we can eliminate
opportunistic behavior by imposing punishment or sanction
on the norm. For instance, the problem of free riding can be
handled through fine and social embarrassment. Oppor-
tunistic agents may be forced to repair the norm by regi-
mented norms after the opportunistic behavior is detected.
When the norm cannot be repaired once being violated,
such an opportunistic behavior is supposed to be prevented
from happening. In other words, the norm should be
implemented in the environment or by designing norm-
abiding agents.
9 Related work
Opportunism is not a new topic in social science. Since it
was proposed by economist Williamson, scholars have
studied this typical social behavior of economic players
from various perspectives, i.e., transaction cost economics
(Williamson 1985), resource-based view (Conner and
Prahalad 1996), game theory (Cabon-Dhersin and Ramani
2007), agency theory (Jiraporn et al. 2008), and strategic
management (Yaqub 2009). Even though they are indeed
all worthwhile, it is difficult to directly apply their con-
clusions to MAS for improving the system’s behavior
because most of them are informal, which makes reasoning
about this behavior in MAS impossible, and also not
commonly accepted even in their own area.
In the field of artificial intelligence, there is a tradition to
devise intelligent artifacts and construct intelligent system
using symbolic representation of all factors involved
(Segerberg et al. 2009). Especially for mathematical logic,
it is a greatly important approach to this field due to its
highly abstract representation and reasoning about social
reality. Therefore, a lot of work on logic formalism has
been designed for representing and reasoning about
dynamical domains such as situation calculus (McCarthy
and Hayes 1968), event calculus Kowalski and Sergot
(1989) and fluent calculus (Thielscher 1998). We chose to
use the situation calculus as our basic framework because it
has been well developed and extended with knowledge
(Scherl and Levesque 2003), belief (Shapiro et al. 2011),
and other model semantics. For instance, in Scherl and
Levesque (2003), an epistemic fluent Know(P, s) is pro-
posed by adapting the standard possible-world model of
knowledge. We use this approach to define knowledge
asymmetry where agents possess different amounts of
knowledge.
Formalization of opportunism is new in MAS, but
there is some work on logic of lying, deception, and
dishonesty (Sakama et al. 2010, 2015; Van Ditmarsch
et al. 2012), which are forms of opportunism. In their
work, modalities for belief and intention are commonly
used for formalizing different types of dishonest com-
munication, which is similar to our work. However,
Sakama’s work (Sakama et al. 2010, 2015) only formal-
izes one agent’s communication to another agent and his
mental states, regardless of the effect on another agent,
which means that we cannot reason about the state tran-
sition based on the approach. The primary goal of van
Ditmarsch’s work (Van Ditmarsch et al. 2012) was to
model lying by modeling how agents’ believes change
from the communications. It analyzes the effect of lying
in public discourse and explains how lying can be used as
an optimal strategy through a game-theoretical analysis.
For providing a formal model of opportunism, we not
only need to formalize the mental states of interacting
agents, but also need to reason about how the physical
situations are changed by opportunistic behavior, both of
which are related to the above work.
We also integrated the notion of value into the situa-
tion calculus to represent agents’ preference on situations.
However, in logical formalization, people usually use
goals rather than value (e.g., Cohen and Levesque 1990;
Rao and Georgeff 1991) for the same purpose. Only some
work in the area of argumentation reasons about agents’
preferences and decision making by value (e.g., Bench-
Capon et al. 2012; van der Weide 2011). Even though
both goals and values can be used to represent agents’
preferences about situations, they have different features.
Goals are concrete and should be specified with time,
place, and objects. For example, to earn 1000 euros next
month is a goal. If one agent’s goal is achieved in one
situation, then he has high evaluation on that situation.
Value is described by Schwartz as trans-situational
(Schwartz 1992), which means that value is relatively
stable and not limited to be applied in a specific situation.
For instance, if honesty is a value of somebody, he will
be honest for a long period of time. Since state transition
results from the performing of actions, we can evaluate
actions by whether our value is promoted or demoted in
the state transition, as what we do in this study. For
representing agents’ evaluation on situations, Keeney and
Raiffa proposed multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT) in
which situations are described in terms of a set of attri-
butes and the utilities of the situations are calculated by
the sum of the scores on each attribute based on agents’
value system (Keeney and Raiffa 1993). In this study, we
use a similar approach in which situations are represented
through propositions and agents refer to a specific
proposition based on their value systems to evaluate a
state transition. Apparently, different agents may refer to
different propositions, thus having different evaluations




Agents situated with information asymmetry might per-
form opportunistic behavior to others in their interest.
Numerous works about such a social behavior have been
done in social science due to its negative effect on the
relationship between people. However, most conclusions
are based on a given form of opportunism, making it hard
to build a fundamental theory that can be applied in any
context. This study takes the initiative to propose a formal
model of opportunism in the multi-agent system context
based on the extended informal definition from Wil-
liamson. The modeling work is done based on the situation
calculus integrating the notion of value. We first have a
preliminary model that only considers a single action
between two agents and then extend it for multiple actions
with social context. Each model captures interesting
properties that are useful for our future research. It is
important to keep in mind that the aim of this paper is not
to find out where opportunistic behavior comes from and
how to eliminate it, but rather to have a thorough under-
standing of the nature of opportunism before exploring
those issues. Therefore, the main strength of this study is
defining such a behavior from our specific perspective in a
formal way, so as to represent the elements in the definition
and their relations and reason about the state transition by
the behavior.
Based on our understanding of the concept of oppor-
tunism, we can study where and when opportunism arises
in a social setting. Evaluation based on different value
systems is the reason for value opposition of a state tran-
sition. So considerable insights can be achieved from the
investigation about the compatibility of different value
systems and the coevolution of agents’ value systems with
social context or environmental changes. Further, as
opportunism is a self-interested behavior that conflicts with
social norms, its emergence might come from the way in
which agents resolve the conflicts between beliefs, obli-
gations, intentions, and desires. For instance, an agent
whose desires always overrule obligations might behave
opportunistically in his interest. Those conflicts and their
resolutions corresponding to different agent types are
investigated in BOID architecture (Broersen et al.
2001, 2005). Similar to lie detection (Ohmoto et al. 2009),
a well-designed monitoring mechanism can be used to
automatically detect opportunism in (computer-based)
human interactions, providing ways to protect agents’
values from being demoted. Another important topic is
designing constraint mechanisms to eliminate or prevent
opportunism from happening.
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Appendix 1: Basic action theories
Based on the situation calculus, Reiter’s basic action the-
ories are of the following form. A basic action theory D
(Reiter 2001; Levesque et al. 1998) is defined as a set of
axioms:
D ¼ R [ Dap [ Dss [ Dso [ Duna
• R: the set of foundational axioms,
• doða1; s1Þ ¼ doða2; s2Þ ! a1 ¼ a2 ^ s1 ¼ s2; Two
situations are the same if and only if they are the
same sequence of actions.
• ð8QÞQðS0Þ ^ ð8s; aÞ½QðsÞ ! Qðdoða; sÞÞ ! ð8sÞ
QðsÞ; This is a second-order induction axiom saying
that for any property Q, if QðS0Þ and, for any
situation s and action a, property Q remains the
same, then we have ð8sÞQðsÞ.
• s doða; s0Þ  sYs0;
• :s S0; The relation provides an ordering
relation on situations. s s0 means that the action
sequence s is a subsequence of that of s0. Thus, s is a
subsequence of doða; s0Þ if and only if s is a
subsequence of s0 or they have the same action
sequence. And no situation is before initial situation
S0.
• Dap: the set of actions preconditions,
PossðaðxÞ; sÞ  pðx; sÞ
where pðx; sÞ is a formula uniform in s and whose free
variables are among x and s. Thus, whether a(x) can be
performed in situation s depends entirely on s.
• Dss: the set of successor state axioms,
Fðdoða; sÞÞ  cþF ða; sÞ _ ðFðsÞ ^ :cF ða; sÞÞ
Here, cþF ða; sÞ and cF ða; sÞ are two formulas expressing the
conditions for the fluent F becoming true and false,
respectively;
• Dso: the sentences uniform in S0 describing the initial
situation;
• Duna: the unique name axioms for actions.
AI & Soc
123
Appendix 2: Possible-world structure
Possible-world structure (or Kripke structure) is the model
that people adopt to formalize knowledge, belief, intention,
and obligation in the situation calculus. Therefore, we will
briefly introduce this model before we use those modalities
in the next section. A Kripke structure is proposed by
Kripke (1963) and has become the standard type of the
models in modal logic and related non-classical logics.
Basically, it is a graph whose nodes represent the possible
situations of the system and whose edges represent acces-
sibility relations. A valuation function maps each node to a
set of properties hold in the corresponding state. Formally,
let U be a set of atomic propositions. A Kripke structure
over U is defined as a tuple M ¼ ðS;R; pÞ, where
• S denotes a set of situations;
• R  S S is a set of accessibility relations;
• p : S ! 2U denotes a valuation function, meaning that
for each situation s 2 S; the set pðsÞ of atomic
propositions hold in s. Therefore, fluents in the situation
calculus can be interpreted as: Given a proposition p,
fluent p(s) holds iff p 2 pðsÞ.
By means of a Kripke structure, we can represent exactly
an agent’s mental state in a certain situation. Figure 1 is an
example of a Kripke structure. Suppose that the actual
situation is that p is true and q is false, represented by
situation s 2 S for which it holds that p(s) and :qðsÞ. Now,
the model can be represented by S ¼ fs; s0; s00g, where s is
as above, s0 is pðs0Þ and qðs0Þ, and s00 is :pðs00Þ and qðs00Þ.
The accessibility relation R is illustrated in Fig. 1.
Kripke structures are adopted by the situation calculus to
represent knowledge, belief, intention, and obligation.
Taking knowledge as an example, we assume that there is
an accessibility relation over situations, where situation s0
is accessible from situation s if an agent residing in situa-
tion s thinks he might be in situation s0. So something is
known in situation s if it holds in situation s and every
situation s0 accessible from s, and something is not known
if it does not hold in at least one accessible situation.
Appendix 3: Neighborhood semantics
Neighborhood semantics (Pacuit 2007), also known as
Scott–Montague semantics, is another formal semantics for
modal logics compared to normal possible-world seman-
tics. It is developed by Dana Scott and Richard Montague.
The basic idea behind a neighborhood model is that: At
each situation, list all the sets that are considered ‘‘neces-
sary.’’ That is, given a non-empty set of situations S, each
situation s is assigned a set of subsets of S (these subsets
are called neighborhoods). Formally, let U be a set of
atomic propositions. A neighborhood model over U is
defined as tuple M ¼ fS;N; vg, where
• S denotes a set of situations;
• N is a neighborhood function N : S ! 22S which
assigns a collection of sets of situations to each
situation in S;
• v : U! 2S denotes a valuation function assigning a set
of possible worlds to each atomic proposition.




Therefore, fluents in the situation calculus can be
interpreted as: Given a proposition p, fluent p(s) holds
iff s 2 vðpÞ.
Similar to Kripke structures, we can represent exactly an
agent’s mental state in a certain situation by neighborhood
semantics. Figure 2 is an example of a neighborhood
model. Suppose that s is the actual situation and S consists
of the following situations: S ¼ fðp; q; rÞ; ðp;:q; rÞ;
ðp; q;:rÞ; ð:p;:q; rÞg. Neighborhood function N(s) returns
a set of subsets of S that are the neighborhoods in s. Set
fðp; q; rÞ; ðp;:q; rÞ; ðp; q;:rÞg is called the truth set of p
and it is a neighborhood in s. The same with :q and r. The
model is illustrated as below:
In this paper, we adopt neighborhood semantics to
define Intention. Suppose we have a set of situations
labeled with propositions. Proposition p is intended to be in
the actual situation s if and only if the truth set of p is an
intentional neighborhood in s.
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